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Implications for Chapter 13
Because the statutory provision relating to payments
"received by" the trustee3 3 applies to Chapter 13
bankruptcies as well as those under Chapter 12, the
controversy is important also to Chapter 13 filers. However,
it should be noted that the provision allowing direct
payment of secured claims for Chapter 12 filings34 is not
identical to the corresponding provision under Chapter 13.35
The Chapter 13 statute omits the language in Chapter 12
that permits direct payments to the secured creditors "by the
trustee or the debtor."36
FOOTNOTES
1 In re Beard, 45 F.3d 113 (6th Cir. 1995).
2 In re Wagner, 36 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 1994).
3 See generally 13 Harl, Agricultural Law § 120.08[3] (1995);
Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 13.03[8][b] (1995).
4 In re Fulkrod, 973 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1992).
5 11 U.S.C. § 1202(a).
6 11 U.S.C. § 1202(d)(1)(B)(i).
7 11 U.S.C. § 1202(d)(1)(B)(ii).
8 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2) (emphasis added).
9 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) (allowing distribution "by the
trustee or the debtor" of debtor property "with respect to each
allowed secured claim"). See, e.g., In re Erickson Partnership,
77 B.R. 738 (Bankr. S.D. 1987), appeal dismissed , 871 F.2d
1092 (8th Cir. 1989). See also In re Beard, 45 F.3d 113, 119
(6th Cir. 1995) (dictum).
10 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2).
11 See, e.g., In re Erickson Partnership, 77 B.R. 738 (Bankr. D.
S.D. 1987), appeal dismissed, 871 F.2d 1092 (8th Cir. 1989)
(payments made outside of plan for claims not modified by
plan or modified by agreement of creditor not subject to
trustee's fee).
12 See 13 Harl, supra n. 3, § 120.08[3]; Harl, supra n. 3, §
13.03[8][b].
13 E.g., In re Rott, 73 B.R. 366 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1987); In re
Hagensick, 73 B.R. 710 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1987).
14 E.g., In re Land, 82 B.R. 572 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988), aff'd, 96
B.R. 310 (D. Colo. 1988); In re Crum, 85 B.R. 878 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 1988); Matter of Pianowski, 92 B.R. 225 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1988).
15 See In re Cannon, 93 B.R. 746 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1988)
(trustee's fees for payments made directly to creditors set at
one-half trustee's fee for payments made through trustee).
16 In re Mikkelsen Farms, Inc., 74 B.R. 280 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987).
17 In re Schollett, 980 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1992); In re Fulkrod,
973 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1992).
18 Note 17 supra.
19 Id.
20 973 F.2d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 1992).
21 973 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1992) (dictum).
22 36 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 1994).
23 36 F.3d 723, 725 (8th Cir. 1994).
24 36 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1994).
25 See 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2).
26 Note 17 supra.
27 36 F.3d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 1994).
28 45 F.3d 113 (6th Cir. 1995).
29 Id.
30 Note 2 supra.
31 See 45 F.3d 113, 119 (6th Cir. 1995).
32 Id.
33 See 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2).
34 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii).
35 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
36 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii), 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor was a grain storage
facility. The debtor experienced financial difficulty and
surrendered its state license but filed for bankruptcy before
the Illinois Department of Agriculture (IDA) began to
liquidate the debtor's grain assets. The IDA sought relief
from the automatic stay in order to liquidate the debtor's
grain assets. The Bankruptcy Court had granted the relief,
holding that the debtor's chance of a successful
reorganization was not good; therefore, the creditors would
be better served if the IDA liquidated the debtor's assets.
The debtor argued that IDA lost its right to liquidate the
assets once the debtor filed for bankruptcy.  The appellate
court affirmed, holding that although the IDA's right to
liquidate was subject to bankruptcy law, the relief was
granted for sufficient cause because of the perishability of
the grain and the debtor's poor chances of a successful
reorganization which would restore its license.  Matter of
C & S Grain Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 233 (7th Cir. 1995).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor sought to avoid a
judicial lien on the debtor's homestead which was claimed
as an exemption under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206(a). The court
held that the state exemption provided that in the event of a
sale of the homestead, the debtor would receive the
exemption amount before payment of any judicial liens;
therefore, the judicial lien could not impair the homestead
exemption and was not avoidable. In re Giordano, 177
B.R. 451 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1995).
TOOLS OF THE TRADE. The debtors, husband and
wife, claimed an exemption for a feed truck as a tool of
their farming business. A creditor objected to the
exemption, arguing that the wife did not have an ownership
interest in the truck and was not in the business of farming;
therefore, the truck was not eligible for a tools of the trade
exemption as to the wife. The wife's name was on the title
for the truck and she provided a substantial amount of help
with the farm operation. The wife did work two days a
week as a beautician but her income from that job was far
less than half of the farm income. The court held that the
wife owned an interest in the truck as a spouse and that the
wife's business was farming for the purposes of the
exemption; therefore, the wife was qualified to claim an
exemption for the truck as a tool of the trade. In re Zink,
177 B.R. 713 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
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EXECUTORY CONTRACTS. The debtor was a grain
storage facility. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtor
had entered into several "to arrive" contracts under which
crop producers contracted for future delivery of crops under
a set price. The debtor experienced financial difficulty and
surrendered its state license but filed for bankruptcy before
the Illinois Department of Agriculture began to liquidate
the debtor's grain assets. Several crop producers petitioned
to be relieved from the "to arrive" contracts and the
Bankruptcy Court granted those motions. The debtor sought
to assume those contracts as executory contracts. The court
held that under state law, once a grain storage facility loses
its license to operate, it can no longer perform on the "to
arrive" contracts and the contracts lose their executory
status. The court held that the debtor could not assume the
contracts. Matter of C & S Grain Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 233
(7th Cir. 1995).
REVOCATION OF DISCHARGE. The debtors
operated a Guernsey breeding business and participated in
national Guernsey shows. The daughter of one of the
debtors was given several cows when the daughter was a
child. However, when the daughter wanted to sell the cows
for college tuition, the parent refused and transferred title to
the cows back to the debtor under a power of attorney. The
daughter won a state court judgment for fraud against the
parent and was attempting garnishment when the parent's
bankruptcy case was filed. The daughter did not investigate
any of the debtors' bankruptcy schedules nor participate in
any creditors' examinations. The debtors received a
discharge without objection from the daughter. The debtors'
schedules listed a pre-petition sale of  Guernsey cows
which formed the basis of the daughter's motion to revoke
the discharge for fraud. The court held that the daughter had
ample opportunity to discover the fraud before and during
the bankruptcy case and failed to participate in the
bankruptcy case; therefore, the daughter could not object to
the discharge. In re Cochard, 177 B.R. 639 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1995).
    CHAPTER 11   -ALM § 13.03.*
PLAN. The debtor's plan provided for satisfaction of a
secured claim by transferring a portion of the farm land
collateral to the creditor. The creditor objected to the plan
as not providing payment of the value of its claim. The
court valued the farm land on the basis of the land's
development potential because much of the land in the area
was held for investment. However, because only a portion
of the collateral land was being transferred the court
required that the plan provide for an "indubitable
equivalent" of the debtor's claim to be paid to the creditor.
The court noted that because the valuation of the land was
uncertain and any sale would not be feasible for at least two
years, any valuation established by the court could lead to
the creditor receiving less than the value of the claim when
the land was sold. Although the court did not require any
specific remedy for approval of the plan, the discussion
suggests that the creditor receive a lien on any collateral
retained by the debtor until the land is sold so that the
creditor can seek any deficiency against the remaining
collateral. In re Arnold & Baker Farms, 177 B.R. 648
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1994).
A creditor filed a claim for an oversecured debt owed by
the debtor. The loan agreement provided for a 12 percent
rate of interest. The debtor's plan provided for payment of
the claim but at 8 percent interest. The court held that the
plan payments must include an interest rate of the prime
rate at the effective date of the plan plus 3 percentage points
for risk. In re Beare Co., 177 B.R. 883 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
CONVERSION. The debtor operated a farm and
owned a corporation which operated an agricultural supply
business. The debtor had personally guaranteed some of the
corporation's debts and when the corporation experienced
financial troubles and the debtor became liable for the
corporation's debts, the debtor filed for Chapter 12. The
debtor believed that when the corporation's debts became
the debtor's obligations, the debts became sufficiently
related to the farming operation to allow the debtor to
qualify for Chapter 12. When that was shown to be false,
the debtor filed for conversion of the case to Chapter 11. A
creditor objected to the conversion and sought dismissal,
arguing that Chapter 12 did not provide for conversions to
Chapter 11. Although the court acknowledged that Chapter
12 contained no provision for conversion to Chapter 11, the
court followed one line of cases which allowed such
conversions if the debtor did not file for Chapter 12 in bad
faith, creditors were not prejudiced by the conversion and
the conversion would be equitable. The court held that
although the belief was unreasonable that the corporation's
debts would become farming debts, the debtor should not
be punished for poor legal counseling and should be
allowed to convert to Chapter 11. The creditor also objected
based on the debtor's failure to timely file a plan. The court
held that the current motion had delayed any plan but
ordered that a Chapter 11 plan must be filed within 40 days.
In re Miller, 177 B.R. 551 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ALLOCATION OF PAYMENTS OF TAXES .
Chapter 13 debtors were officers in a corporation which had
filed and completed a separate Chapter 7 case. In the
Chapter 7 case, the IRS claims for taxes were partially paid,
including employment trust fund taxes. The IRS allocated a
portion of the payments to non-trust fund taxes. Because
the debtor's were "responsible persons" in the corporation,
they were also personally liable for the trust fund taxes not
paid by the corporation; thus, the debtors' tax liability in the
Chapter 13 case would have been reduced if all of the
corporation's tax payments were allocated first to the trust
fund taxes. The court held that the tax payments of a
separate but related Chapter 7 case could not be reallocated
by Chapter 13 debtors. The court noted that such
reallocation would unfairly allow responsible persons to
shift the risk of non-payment of employment taxes to the
IRS. In re Simms, 177 B.R. 537 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994).
The IRS filed an undersecured claim in the debtors'
Chapter 7 case for taxes owed for 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990
and 1991. The taxes for 1987 and 1988 were dischargeable
and the debtors sought allocation of the property securing
the IRS claim by first paying the 1989 and later taxes,
leaving unpaid the dischargeable portion of the claim. The
IRS, of course, wanted to allocate the property to the
dischargeable taxes first, leaving the nondischargeable
taxes outstanding. The court held that in a Chapter 7 case,
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the IRS has the right to allocate the tax payments. The court
noted that equity considerations favor the IRS because the
IRS would lose all chances of payment of the dischargeable
taxes if the debtors were allowed to determine the
allocation of the payments, whereas in Chapter 11 cases, an
allocation which is needed for a successful reorganization
would help the IRS collect the taxes. In re Schilling, 177
B.R. 862 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995).
AUTOMATIC STAY . During the taxpayer’s
bankruptcy case, the IRS, in violation of the automatic stay,
assessed the taxpayer for additional I.R.C. § 6672 penalties.
The taxpayer did not object to the assessments during the
bankruptcy case which did not discharge the penalties.
After the close of the bankruptcy case, the taxpayer signed
a Tax Collection Waiver extending the statute of limitations
on collection of the penalties and agreed to pay the
penalties in installments. The taxpayer also requested liens
against an interest in a pension plan and the taxpayer’s
home in order to allow the taxpayer more time to pay the
penalties. After the extension on the statute of limitations
expired, the taxpayer petitioned for refund of the
assessments made during the bankruptcy case. Although the
court acknowledged that the assessments made in violation
of the automatic stay were void, the court held that the
assessments would be allowed because the taxpayer
willfully delayed objecting to the assessments until the IRS
was unable to correct the mistake and make proper
assessments after the bankruptcy case. The appellate court
affirmed but held that the assessments were only avoidable
and not void. Bronson v. U.S., 46 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1995), aff'g, 28 Fed. Cl. 756 (1993).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. Most of the Chapter 11 debtor's
estate was claimed as exempt property. Within 90 days
before the petition, the IRS filed a tax lien against the
debtor's property and the IRS filed a claim in the case. The
debtor, as debtor-in-possession, filed a motion to avoid the
tax lien under Sections 547(c) and 545(2) which allow a
trustee to avoid statutory liens as a bona fide purchaser. The
court ruled that the debtor could avoid the tax lien because
I.R.C. § 6323(b) exempts bona fide purchasers from
enforcement of the lien. However, the IRS argued that
Section 522(c) provided that exempt property is expressly
made subject to tax liens and that Section 522(c)(2)
overrides the avoidance authority granted in Section 545(2).
The court held that the avoidance powers conferred on
trustees, or debtors-in-possession acting as trustees, were
provided to benefit the bankruptcy estate but in the case of
exempt assets, the avoidance of a statutory lien would only
benefit the debtor.  Therefore, Section 522(c)(2) balanced
the avoidance powers by subjecting exempt property to tax
liens. The court held that the debtor's exempt property
remained subject to the tax lien. In re O'Neil, 177 B.R. 809
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1995).
DISCHARGE. The IRS sought nondischargeability for
taxes from years more than three years before the filing of
the debtor's petition because the tax returns for those years
were fraudulent. The debtor was a self-employed logger
and filed joint returns with the debtor's spouse. The
evidence demonstrated that the returns substantially
understated the debtor's income from the business and the
debtor failed to substantiate many of the claimed business
expenses. The debtor argued that none of the evidence
specifically showed that the debtor was responsible for the
fraudulent return filings. The debtor claimed that the spouse
handled the finances and return preparation. The court held
that the debtor failed to provide sufficient evidence to
support an "innocent spouse" defense and that the debtor's
involvement with the business and signature on the returns
was sufficient to attribute the fraudulent filings to the
debtor. In re Rivers, 178 B.R. 9 (S.D. Ala. 1994).
The debtor failed to timely file returns for several tax
years and also falsely declared extra dependents on W-4
forms to reduce withholding taxes. The debtor argued that
the taxes were not nondischargeable for willful attempt to
evade taxes because the debtor was willful only in failing to
pay the taxes and did not falsify tax returns. The court held
that there was no exception for only failing to pay taxes and
that the debtor's failure to timely file returns and the
falsifying of W-4 forms were sufficient demonstration that
the debtor willfully attempted to evade the taxes involved.
In re Ketchum, 177 B.R. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
The debtor filed the tax returns for 1986 and 1987 in
late 1990. Less than two years later, the debtor filed for
Chapter 13 but the case was dismissed one year later.  The
debtor refiled for Chapter 7 two months later and more than
two years after the filing of the 1986 and 1987 tax returns.
The court held that the two year limit of Section
523(a)(1)(B)(ii) was suspended during the Chapter 13 case
when the IRS was prevented from attempting to collect the
taxes for 1986 and 1987; therefore, the time limit had not
expired when the second case was filed and the taxes were
nondischargeable. In re Jones, 177 B.R. 541 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio. 1994).
ELIGIBILITY. The debtor filed for Chapter 13 after
the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code raised the
debt limitation to $250,000 for Chapter 13 filings. The IRS
filed a claim for over $600,000 and filed for dismissal of
the case because the debtor's liquidated claims exceeded
$250,000. The debtor argued that the IRS claim was
contested and sought a court determination as to the amount
of taxes owed. The court held that the tax claim was
unliquidated because there was no way to determine the tax
claim amount without an evidentiary hearing; therefore, the
case was not dismissed. In re Elrod, 178 B.R. 5 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
DISASTER PAYMENTS. The plaintiff operated a
kidney bean and corn farm and owned a kidney bean
marketing agency which marketed the plaintiff's own beans
and beans produced by other farmers. The plaintiff also
owned a farm equipment business. The plaintiff applied for
disaster assistance payments and was denied the payments
based on a determination that the plaintiff had income of
over $2 million. The USDA included the gross receipts of
the marketing agency received for beans the agency sold for
other farmers. These receipts, less the commission, were
never the property of the marketing agency. The court held
that 7 C.F.R. § 1477.3(g) was a valid interpretation of the
statutory definition of "gross income" to include all receipts
of an applicant in determining eligibility for disaster
payments. Thus, the gross receipts of the sales of other
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producer's bean by the marketing agency were included in
the plaintiff's nonfarm income. Because the plaintiff's farm
income was less than 50 percent of the plaintiff's total
income, all of the income was included for determining
whether the plaintiff's income exceeded $2 million. Doane
v. Espy, 873 F. Supp. 1266 (W.D. Wis. 1993).
EGGS. The AMS has adopted as final regulations
clarifying and updating the voluntary shell egg grading
regulations. The amendments include defining washed
ungraded eggs, amending the definition of quality
assurance inspector, upgrading room requirements for
mechanized shell egg operations, and harmonizing with the
U.S. Standards the standards for quality of individual shell
eggs for B quality in U.S. Nest-Run grades. 60 Fed. Reg.
12401 (April 7, 1995).
   PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].*  The petitioner purchased apples
from producers and supplied the apples to supermarkets.
The petitioner's loans were called and the petitioner was left
with little cash to pay sellers and several apple purchases
were not paid promptly. A PACA complaint was filed and
by the time of the hearing, the petitioner had either paid for
the apples or had made arrangements to pay for the apples.
However, the administrative law judge ruled that the
petitioner had committed repeated, willful and flagrant
violations of PACA and revoked the petitioner's license.
The petitioner challenged the revocation as not fully
considering the mitigating factors. The court found that the
revocation was supported by the facts in that the petitioner
was found to have focused on supporting its non-PACA
operations first and to have failed to notify sellers that
payments could be late. Norinsberg Corp. v. U.S.D.A., 47
F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
PLANT QUARANTINE. The petitioner was a
wholesaler of nursery products and contracted through a
broker for the purchase of evergreen trees from a supplier.
The supplier obtained the trees in an area quarantined under
the federal Plant Quarantine Act, because of a gypsy moth
infestation and the trees were shipped without certification
that the trees were free of gypsy moth. The court held that
the petitioner was liable for violation of the quarantine
because the petitioner failed to determine that the trees
came from a nonquarantined area or were certified for
shipment from the area. Valkering, U.S.A., Inc. v.
U.S.D.A., 48 F.3d 305 (8th Cir. 1995).
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS has issued an interim
regulation changing North Carolina from a modified
accredited state to an accredited-free state. 60 Fed. Reg.
18728 (April 13, 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent's will  bequeathed the residue of the
estate to the decedent's surviving spouse. The will also
provided that if the spouse predeceased the decedent, an
amount equal to the GSTT exemption amount would pass
to the decedent's grandchildren. The surviving spouse
disclaimed a fraction of the residuary bequest sufficient to
put the estate at the 53 percent marginal tax rate. Under the
will, the disclaimed property passed to the grandchildren in
the amount equal to the decedent's unused GSTT exemption
amount with the remainder passing to the decedent's other
descendants. The IRS ruled that the disclaimer was
qualified and that the GSTT inclusion ratio would be zero.
Ltr. Rul. 9513011, Dec. 29, 1994.
In 1953, five irrevocable trusts were created for the
grantors' five children. The trusts provided for five trustees
and a minimum of three trustees in order to execute any
fiduciary duties. The beneficiaries sought amendment of the
trusts to provide for two trustees and consent of a minimum
of two trustees to execute fiduciary duties. The IRS ruled
that the changes would not subject the trusts to GSTT. Ltr.
Rul. 9513024, Jan. 3, 1995.
Two sisters and their sister-in-law created trusts which
each had the same five grandnieces and grandnephews as
reminder holders in trust. The remainder holders were the
current beneficiaries and merged their trusts into five trusts,
one for each beneficiary. The IRS ruled that the merger
would not subject the pre-1985 trusts to GSTT, would not
result in recognition of gain, and would not affect the
income tax basis or holding period of the trust assets. Ltr.
Rul. 9514013, Jan. 6, 1995.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.*  In 1982, the decedent sold parcels
of farm land to the decedent's children on installment
contracts.  The contracts did not contain specific payment
provisions but allowed for payments as each child could
afford. No interest was charged under the contracts. The
decedent continued to farm the land and receive all
government subsidy payments and to pay all taxes. Each
child did make some payments under the contracts and the
estate contended that the decedent forgave $50,000 on each
contract, although no written evidence supported this
contention. After the decedent was admitted to the intensive
care unit of a nursing home, the decedent executed deeds
for the farm land parcels covered by the installment
contracts. On the same day, the decedent conveyed
additional real property to the children in exchange for
annuity agreements under which each child was to pay the
decedent $10,000 annually. The decedent forgave the initial
payment and no further payments were made before the
decedent's death 13 months later.  The IRS ruled that the
differences between the fair market value of the farm land
covered by the installment contracts and the amounts paid
by the children were taxable gifts to the children. The IRS
ruled that none of the forgiven portions of the installment
contracts could be considered because of the lack of written
evidence of the forgiveness. The IRS also ruled that the
transfer of property in exchange for the annuities was a gift
because no consideration was received in that the decedent
had no intention of requiring any payments, given the
decedent's history of forgiving the annuity payments.
Within one year of death, the decedent executed a plenary
present durable power of attorney and a "Direction to Make
Gifts" granting the decedent child the power to "preserve
the estate" and to make gifts of the decedent's property. The
"Direction to Make Gifts" provided for annual gifts to
specific person in the amount equal to the annual exclusion
amount. Thirteen such gifts were made before the
decedent's death. The IRS ruled that because the durable
power of attorney specifically authorized the making of
gifts, the gifts were irrevocable when made and were not
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included in the decedent's gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9513001,
Nov. 28, 1994.
The taxpayer was an employee of a corporation which
offered stock option plans for the employees under which
the employees had the right to purchase stock at the option
plan date. The options terminated either in ten years or
upon the termination of employment. The taxpayer
transferred some of these options to family members in
trust. The IRS ruled that the termination of employment
was not a power in the taxpayer to affect the transfer of the
options. The corporation's board of directors had the power
to revoke or alter an option plan without the consent of the
taxpayer. The IRS ruled that the transfers of the options
would be completed gifts and the options would not be
included in the taxpayer's gross estate because the taxpayer
did not retain any control over the options after the
transfers. Ltr. Rul. 9514017, Jan. 9, 1995.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent and surviving spouse were beneficiaries of an
intervivos trust. At the death of the decedent, the trust
passed to two trusts, one with the surviving spouse's
separate property and half of the community property plus
so much of the decedent's share of the trust as to reduce the
estate tax to zero. The surviving spouse was the sole
beneficiary of the income from this trust and had the power
to require distribution of trust principal. The trust also
granted the trustee the power to distribute trust principal,
even without request from the spouse, for the spouse's
health, maintenance and education. The trust also provided
for appointment of a guardian if the spouse became
incapacitated. The IRS ruled that the decedent's property
passing to the trust was eligible QTIP. Ltr. Rul. 9514002,
Dec. 20, 1994.
The decedent's will made specific devises to the
decedent's heirs and bequeathed the residue of the estate to
a trust for the surviving spouse. The will provided that all
death taxes were to be paid from the residue of the estate
without apportionment among the specific bequests. The
will also provided that if the spouse survived the decedent,
the residuary trust was to be split into two trusts with one
trust to receive enough property to qualify for the marital
deduction sufficient to decrease the federal estate tax to
zero. The court held that the will was unambiguous that the
death taxes were to be paid solely from the residue of the
estate; therefore, the amount of property eligible for the
marital deduction was to be decreased by the amount of
death taxes incurred by the estate. Estate of Lewis v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-168.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS
SMALL BUSINESS STOCK-ALM § 7.02[2][b].* The
taxpayers claimed ordinary loss deductions for I.R.C. §
1244 stock. The deduction was denied because the
taxpayers failed to provide evidence that the corporation
qualified as a small business corporation under I.R.C. §
1244 and failed to show when the stock became worthless.
Kaufman v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-146.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The decedent had purchased life insurance which
was supposed to have an automatic premium payment
feature. After the decedent died in an accident, the
insurance company refused to pay the face value of the
policy because of nonpayment of premiums and the
decedent's estate sued for bad faith. The estate was awarded
actual damages plus punitive damages. Under Mississippi
case law, punitive damages were considered in part as
punishment and in part as compensation for plaintiffs who
bring suits against tortfeasors. The court held that punitive
damages were includible in the estate's taxable income
because the punitive damages were not received as
compensation for personal injuries.  Wesson v. U.S., 95-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,186 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 843
F. Supp. 1119 (D. Miss. 1994).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-ALM §
4.02[15].* The taxpayers transferred farmland and cash to a
creditor in partial satisfaction of indebtedness with the
creditor forgiving the remainder of the debt. The value of
the farmland exceeded its basis to the taxpayers and the
taxpayers were insolvent before and after the debt
forgiveness. The court held that although the discharge of
indebtedness income realized from the debt forgiveness
(determined using the land’s fair market value) was not
income to the taxpayers, the gain from the difference
between the land’s fair market value and the taxpayers’
basis in the land was taxable income. Note: the result can
be illustrated graphically as follows:
Not taxable Gain Discharge of indebtedness
|________________|________________|_______________________________|
0 Basis FMV Debt
Gehl v. Comm’r, 95-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,191
(8th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 102 T.C. No. 37 (1994).
FUEL TAX CREDIT. The taxpayer operated on-road
vehicles in the taxpayer's business and claimed a fuel tax
credit for a portion of the fuel used by the equipment for the
power takeoff and hydraulic systems on the vehicles. The
taxpayer challenged Treas. Reg. § 48.4041-7 because the
regulation did not allow any fuel tax credit for highway
vehicles which used some fuel for non-highway uses. The
court held that the regulation complied with the statutory
requirement that fuel for highway vehicles was not eligible
for the fuel tax credit. Western Waste industries v.
Comm'r, 104 T.C. No. 23 (1995).
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer
owned a small pet shop business which had experienced at
least seven straight years of losses. The taxpayer also had
full time employment elsewhere but did not receive a high
income from that job. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer
did not have a profit motive in operating the store because
the taxpayer did not maintain an accurate recordkeeping
system and did little to increase the store's profitability. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the Tax Court did not
give sufficient weight to other factors involved in the case,
such as the taxpayer's modest income from other sources
and the taxpayer's moving of the store to a more favorable
location.  Ranciato v. Comm'r, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,194 (2d Cir. 1995), rev'g and rem'g, T.C.
Memo. 1993-536.
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INVESTMENT DEDUCTIONS . The taxpayer
invested in a sale-and-leaseback trust which purchased
computer equipment and leased the equipment to third
parties. The transactions were financed through circular
financing using nonrecourse notes and a guaranty of some
of the loans by the parties involved in the transactions. The
court denied the deductions in excess of the taxpayer's
investment because the taxpayer was not at risk as to the
loans obtained by the investment trust to purchase the
computers. Garvey v. U.S., 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,198 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.03[12].* The
taxpayer was a publicly owned corporation which operated
child care centers. The taxpayer claimed investment tax
credit for wall panels used for writing, mansard roof
systems, playground fencing, exterior lighting systems,
handicap restroom accessories, grease traps in the kitchen,
thermal recovery systems and split door systems. The court
held that the property items were not eligible for investment
tax credit because the property items were integrated into
the building structures so that the property was structural
components. La Petite Academy v. U.S., 95-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,193 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES-ALM § 4.02[16].* The
taxpayer sold property held for investment but did not
purchase like-kind property until 470 days later. The court
held that the transactions were not eligible for like-kind
exchange gain deferment under I.R.C. § 1031 because the
taxpayer failed to identify the exchange property within 45
days after the sale of the first property. Kunkel v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1995-162.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ANTI-ABUSE RULE. The IRS has adopted as final
amendment of the anti-abuse regulations to provide that the
regulations apply only to I.R.C. subtitle A (income tax). 60
Fed. Reg. 18741 (April 13, 1995), adding Treas. Reg. §
1.701-2(h).
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in April 1995,
the weighted average is 7.30 percent with the permissible
range of 6.57 to 7.96 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.57 to 8.03 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 95-
23, I.R.B. 1995-17, 8.
The IRS has announced the procedures of the Tax
Sheltered Annuity Voluntary Correction Program which
allows employers to voluntarily correct some defects in
I.R.C. § 403(b) annuity plans. Rev. Proc. 95-24, I.R.B.
1995-18.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. The taxpayer was
an S corporation with three shareholders who operated a
large farm. The corporation leased the land to a third party
on a cropshare basis for some time, with the shareholders
providing consulting, planting and harvesting help. The
shareholders' help was necessary in order for the tenant to
successfully operate the farm. Later the taxpayer cash
leased the farm to another tenant. The shareholders
provided even more assistance to this tenant. The ruling
does not disclose the precise nature of the assistance nor the
amount of time spent by the shareholders in assisting the
tenants. The IRS ruled that the rental income under both
leases was not passive investment income. Ltr. Rul.
9514005, Dec. 23, 1994.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
May 1995
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.62 6.51 6.46 6.42
110% AFR 7.29 7.16 7.10 7.06
120% AFR 7.96 7.81 7.74 7.69
Mid-term
AFR 7.12 7.00 6.94 6.90
110% AFR 7.85 7.70 7.63 7.58
120% AFR 8.58 8.40 8.31 8.26
Long-term
AFR 7.52 7.38 7.31 7.27
110% AFR 8.28 8.12 8.04 7.99
120% AFR 9.06 8.86 8.76 8.70
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer had purchased
rental real estate with the taxpayer's parents as tenants in
common. The purchase was made with a loan for which the
taxpayer was personally liable. The taxpayer then sold the
taxpayer's personal residence. The taxpayer gave the
parents the taxpayer's interest in the rental property but
remained liable on the debt. The taxpayer then repurchased
the rental property from the parents for use as the personal
residence and assumed the entire remaining balance of the
loan. The court held that taxpayer could not include the
assumed debt in calculating the tax gain or loss deferment
on the sale and repurchase of a personal residence because
the assumed debt was not incurred within two years of the
sale and repurchase, since the taxpayer became liable on the
debt many years before the sale of the personal residence.
Dunnegan v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-167.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT. The IRS has issued guidance
for self-employed persons eligible for the 25 percent
deduction for health insurance costs who either filed their
1994 returns without claiming the deduction, filed their
returns and claimed the deduction but were denied the
deduction, or who had filed the deduction and were not
denied the deduction. IR-95-34, April 11, 1995.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
FEED AUGER. The plaintiff was a farm equipment
repairer who was hired to repair a feed auger owned by the
defendant. The defendant contracted with farmers to raise
turkeys and supplied the feed systems for those farmers.
The plaintiff was injured after repairing the auger when the
plaintiff attempted to free the auger from a clog in the feed.
The plaintiff sued under strict liability and negligence. The
evidence showed that the plaintiff knew that the method
chosen to free the auger could be dangerous and that other
methods were used to free augers in the past. The court held
that the defendant was not liable under strict liability
because the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of injury.
The court found that the plaintiff had finished repairing  the
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auger and that freeing the auger from the clog was not a
part of the repair; therefore, the court held that the
defendant did not owe any duty to the plaintiff for the
injury which occurred after the contracted for repairs were
completed. Perdue Farms, Inc. v. Pryor, 646 N.E.2d 715
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
VETERINARIANS
VETERINARIAN-CLIENT PRIVILEGE. The
debtor's cattle were repossessed by a creditor prior to
bankruptcy. During the bankruptcy case, the debtor claimed
that the cattle's value decreased because of the negligent
care by the creditor. The cattle had been examined and
treated by a veterinarian while in the possession of the
creditor and the debtor sought to present the testimony of
the veterinarian to support the claim of negligence. The
creditor objected and claimed the veterinarian-client
privilege under Kan. Stat. § 47-839 for the veterinarian's
testimony. The statute provided that the veterinarian-client
privilege could be waived by the client or owner of the
animals involved placing the issue of the care and treatment
in issue in a civil or criminal proceeding. The court held
that the debtor was still the owner of the cattle and had
placed the care of the animals in issue in the bankruptcy
case; therefore, the veterinarian-client privilege was waived
and the testimony would be allowed. In re Krug, 177 B.R.
711 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
Adler v. U.S., 32 Fed. Cl. 736 (1995) (passive activity
losses) see p. 55 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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